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Evidence
NEWTON B. FOWLER III*
INTRODUCTION
During the Survey period, Kentucky courts addressed several
significant issues in evidence law.' Most notably, the Kentucky
Supreme Court redefined the use in a criminal case of prior
criminal convictions to impeach a witness, including the accused.
This Survey will highlight this decision and, to a lesser extent,
discuss decisions addressing similar occurrences, spontaneous
statements and the use of polygraph tests. 2
I. EVIDENCE OF SIMILAR OCCURRENCES
Evidence of events whose circumstances are similar to those
at issue often is offered for the probative value of showing
conformity or repetition. Decisional law, over the years, has
addressed the admissibility of such evidence according to its
nature: habit, custom or similar occurrences.
Kentucky law prohibits the introduction of evidence of a
person's habit to prove that he acted in conformity therewith
* J.D. Candidate, University of Kentucky, 1985. The author expresses his apprecia-
tion to Richard H. Underwood, Associate Professor of Law, for his assistance in the
preparation of this Survey.
I For the purposes of continuity and utility, the author has followed the format
suggested in prior Surveys of Kentucky Evidence Law. See, e.g., R. LAWSON, THE
KENTUCKY EVIDENCE LAW HANDBOOK (2d ed. 1984); Underwood, Kentucky Law Survey
- Evidence, 71 Ky. L.J. 287 (1982-83).
2 This Survey does not treat, but takes this opportunity to point out, the following
significant cases: Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1984) (qualified opinion of an
expert witness based on reasonable probability is admissible); Basham v. Commonwealth,
675 S.W.2d 376 (Ky. 1984) (evidence obtained in wiretap operation conducted by federal
law officials is admissible in Kentucky courts, despite Kentucky statute making electronic
eavesdropping illegal), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1749 (1985); American Motors Corp. v.
Addington, No. 82-CA-1624-MR, 31 Ky. L. Summ. 5, at 4 (Ky. Ct. App. July 13, 1984)
(rollover propensity of other vehicles inadmissible where dissimilarities involved cause
such evidence to be prejudicial); Rohleder v. French, 675 S.W.2d 8 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984)
(review being limited to matters properly introduced into the trial record, documents
not properly introduced pursuant to Ky. REv. STAT. § 422.020(5) [hereinafter cited as
KRS] cannot be reviewed on appeal); Dillard v. Ackerman, 668 S.W.2d 560 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1984) (police officer cannot express opinion on reasonableness of automobile speed
at time of accident); Commonwealth v. Morrison, 661 S.W.2d 471 (Ky. 1983) (litigant's
prior misconduct properly excluded after balancing of probative value and prejudicial
effect).
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on a particular occasion.3 Habit is one's regular response to a
particular repeated situation.4 While habit is related to character,
the latter tends to be a more generalized description of one's
disposition with respect to a general trait, such as honesty or
peacefulness, rather than a description of one's regular response
to a particular situation. 5 Judicial reluctance to admit evidence
of habit may be due to its kinship with character, since both are
offered to prove an act in conformity therewith. 6
Custom is a trait which prevails in a business, trade, profes-
sion or calling.7 In contrast to habit, evidence of custom is
admissible in Kentucky to prove any material element of a claim
or defense." Similar occurrences are specific events involving a
party to the litigation which need not amount to either habit or
custom and which may even be one time occurrences. 9 The
admissibility of evidence of occurrences similar to those being
I R. LAWSON, supra note 1, at § 2.25(A)(1). See also Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P.
Ry. v. Hare's Adm'x, 178 S.W.2d 835, 838 (Ky. 1944) (evidence that a driver always
stopped and paid attention at a railroad crossing inadmissible to prove absence of
negligence on particular occasion); Siler v. Renfro Supply Co., 26 S.W.2d 12, 13 (1930)
(evidence that decedent was generally careful and prudent driver ruled inadmissible).
This is contrary to the federal rules which permit the introduction of evidence of one's
habit to prove conduct on a particular occasion in conformity with that habit. See FED.
R. EVID. 406 [hereinafter cited as FRE]. FRE 406 states:
Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an orga-
nization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of
eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or orga-
nization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or
routine practice.
While courts frown on the use of character traits evidence to prove an act in conformity
therewith on a particular occasion, they are more receptive to evidence of habit or
business custom. See generally Green, Relevancy and Its Limits, 1969 Aiz. ST. L.J.
533; Lewan, The Rationale of Habit Evidence, 16 SYRACUSE L. REv. 39 (1964).
4 See R. LAWSON, supra note 1, at § 2.25.
Id. at § 2.25(C).
Kentucky is in the minority in failing to distinguish between habit and character.
In most jurisdictions, habit evidence is admissible while character evidence is inadmissible
to prove action in conformity therewith. Kentucky excludes both types of evidence. See
id.
Id. at § 2.25(C).
Id. See also R.H. Kyle Furniture Co. v. Russell Dry Goods Co., 340 S.W.2d
220, 223 (Ky. 1960) (evidence that business custom of store was for manager to serve
as purchasing agent was admissible on the issue of agency); Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P.
Ry. v. Zeder, 328 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Ky. 1959) (if properly established, business custom
that transporters of heavy machinery notify railroad prior to operating on the tracks
admissible to prove negligence).
9 See R. LAWSON, supra note 1, at § 2.25.
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litigated is contingent on some special relationship between the
prior occurrences and an element of the case. 10 Evidence of
similar occurrences is admissible only where its relevancy goes
beyond mere similarity."
The purpose for offering the evidence is important in eval-
uating its admissibility.' 2 Thus, evidence can be admitted to show
the existence of a dangerous condition or notice thereof, or to
show a representation or misrepresentation. 3 However, Ken-
tucky courts have been reluctant to admit evidence of similar
occurrences of carefulness or carelessness to prove negligence on
a particular occasion 14 because such evidence is considered to
have little probative worth in contrast to its potential for con-
fusion. 5
A court of appeals ruling16 offered the Kentucky Supreme
Court an opportunity to apply the similar occurrences doctrine
in an unusual factual situation. Montgomery Elevator Co. v.
McCullough, 7 a products liability action, involved an injury
caused by an escalator located in a Shillito's department store.'i
Kevin McCullough, a ten-year old boy, was riding the escalator
when his foot was caught and crushed between the escalator's
tread and skirt. 9 The plaintiff settled with Shillito's and brought
suit against Montgomery Elevator Company, the manufacturer
of the escalator, for defective product design. 20
The jury found Montgomery Elevator liable and apportioned
50 R. LAWSON, supra note 1, at § 2.25(B)(1). See generally 2 J. WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE
§§ 252, 457-58 (Chadbourne ed. 1979); 22 C. WIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 5170 (1977); Morris, Proof of Safety Hivtory in Negligence Cases,
61 HARv. L. REV. 205 (1948); 63 AM. JuR.2D Products Liability §§ 236-37, 274 (1984);
29 AM. JUR.2D Evidence §§ 305-14 (1967); 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 234 (1964).
" Massie v. Salmon, 277 S.W.2d 49, 51 (Ky. 1955) (evidence that defendant had
permitted other cattle to run at large in the past inadmissible to show similar conduct
with a different animal).
See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 200 (3d ed. 1984).
" See R. LAWSON, supra note 1, at § 2.25(B)(1).
" See, e.g., Kentucky-W. Va. Gas Co. v. Slone, 238 S.W.2d 476, 480-81 (Ky.
1951); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Taylor's Adm'r, 104 S.W. 776 (Ky. 1907).
"1 See R. LAWSON, supra note 1, at § 2.25.
,6 Montgomery Elevator Co. v. McCullough, 30 KLS 7, at 1 (Ky. Ct. App. Nov.
2, 1983).
" 676 S.W.2d 776 (Ky. 1984). Montgomery is also discussed in Adams, Kentucky
Law Survey - Torts, 73 Ky. L.J. 481 (1984-85).
I Id. at 778.
19 Id.
0 Id.
1985]
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the $50,000 claim equally between Montgomery Elevator and
Shillito's. 21 Montgomery Elevator appealed to the court of ap-
peals claiming, in part, error regarding the admissibility of evi-
dence of prior escalator accidents.22 The court agreed with
Montgomery Elevator and held that the trial court erred in
admitting evidence of the prior accidents.23 From this decision,
McCullough appealed.
At trial, McCullough had introduced proof of other accidents
involving identical or substantially similar escalators where a
victim's foot was caught between the tread and skirt. 24 The
Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that in a defective design
products liability case, evidence of similar product failures under
similar conditions is both relevant and admissible .2  Evidence of
similar injuries can be used to show either the dangerous nature
of the product or the cause of the accident. 26 Both purposes are
relevant since the evidence makes the presence of a defect either
more or less probable.2 7
In upholding the admission of evidence of similar occur-
rences, the Court reaffirmed that the earlier accidents must be
"substantially similar" to the accident at issue.28 Substantial
similarity, the Court concluded, is a matter of relevance to be
determined by the trial court in its discretion.29 Evidence of
21 Id.
2 Id.
23 Id.
14 Id. at 783. This Survey does not address two other issues presented on appeal:
the notice of defect sent to Shillito's after delivery, see id. at 780-82; and the manufac-
turing at the same time and in the same plant by Montgomery Elevator of an escalator
of safer design. See id. at 784 (Stephenson, J., dissenting). See also Adams, supra note
17, at 495-98.
2 Id. Evidence of similar accidents has become a common element of proof in
products liability cases. See generally 1 L. FRUmER & M. FRIDMAN, PRODUCTS LiBmrry
§ 12.01 (1960); Annot., 42 A.L.R.3D 780 (1972) (other accidents used to prove dangerous
nature of product).
See 676 S.W.2d at 783.
27 See Annot., supra note 25, at 795-96.
21 See 676 S.W.2d at 783. See also FRE 401 which states: " 'Relevant Evidence'
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence."
Id. Assuming arguendo that it was error to introduce evidence of prior accidents,
the Court also noted that such error was harmless and that Montgomery Elevator had
waived its right to object by its own placing of the injury list in front of the jury. Id.
at 783-84.
[Vol. 73
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similar escalator injuries was, for the Court, both relevant and
admissible. 0
II. PRIOR CRIMINAL ACTS OF THE ACCUSED: IMPEACHMENT BY
USE OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS
In Kentucky, a witness in a criminal case, including an
accused who chooses to testify, may be impeached by proof of
any prior felony conviction.31 This rule, announced in Common-
wealth v. Richardson,32 overrules the eighteen-year-old Cotton
v. Commonwealth33 standard.14 Cotton had limited impeachment
by proof of prior felony convictions to evidence of convictions
for crimes involving dishonesty, stealing, or false statement. 3
Richardson essentially represents a return to the pre-Cotton
standard of Cowan v. Commonwealth, under which any prior
felony conviction is potentially available for impeachment.3 6
Clarification of the impact of Richardson requires careful review
of the decision, especially of its treatment of Cotton.
A. Cotton v. Commonwealth
In Cotton v. Commonwealth the defendant, Cotton, was
convicted of armed robbery and attempted armed robbery. 37
Claiming that prejudicial error resulted from the prosecution's
,0 See id. at 783.
11 Commonwealth v. Richardson, 674 S.W.2d 515 (Ky. 1984). At common law a
felony conviction or a conviction for a misdemeanor involving dishonesty rendered the
person altogether incompetent as a witness. See J. WIsMoXE supra note 10, at 520. The
Federal Rules of Evidence represent a compromise, providing impeachment according to
the nature of the crime and the length of imprisonment. FRE 609(a) provides:
For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he
has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from him or
established by public record during cross-examination but only if the crime
(1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect
to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless
of the punishment.
32 674 S.W.2d 515.
" 454 S.W.2d 698, 702 (Ky. 1970), overruled by Commonwealth v. Richardson,
674 S.W.2d 515.
674 S.W.2d at 517.
11 454 S.W.2d at 702, overruling Cowan v. Commonwealth, 407 S.W.2d 695, 698
(Ky. 1966).
- 674 S.W.2d at 517, citing Cowan, 407 S.W.2d 695.
11 454 S.W.2d at 699.
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efforts to show the jury that he had several felony convictions,
Cotton appealed his conviction.3 8 On cross-examination, the
prosecutor asked Cotton if he had ever been convicted.3 9 After
several unsuccessful objections, Cotton admitted a prior felony
conviction .40
The Kentucky high court used Cotton's appeal as an oppor-
tunity to review the Kentucky rule on impeachment by use of
prior felony convictions. The Court found the fundamental basis
of the impeachment standard was that no admonition to a jury
could rightly eliminate the prejudice visited on the defendant by
the disclosure of past felonies unrelated to credibility. 41 The
purposes of impeachment were found to be best served by a rule
which limited the availability of prior conviction evidence to
felonies involving dishonesty, stealing or false statement. 2 In
essence, the Court was convinced that a prior conviction was
only relevant when the circumstances underlying the conviction
bore directly on the witness's credibility. 43
Consequently, the Court modified its earlier rule, stated in
Cowan v. Commonwealth,44 which had allowed impeachment by
all felony convictions .4 The Court also established two precon-
ditions to the admission of evidence of a prior felony conviction.
First, the trial court-in a proceeding colloquially known as
a Cotton hearing-had to determine outside the presence of the
jury whether the prior felony conviction involved dishonesty,
stealing or false statement.46 Second, even where the prior con-
viction was relevant to the witness's credibility, the trial court
was to exercise "sound judicial discretion" in admitting evidence
of the prior conviction-the value of the evidence as it related
to credibility was to be weighed against its potential for prejudice
to the defendant. 47
Dean Lawson, in his treatise on Kentucky evidence law,4
11 Id. at 700.
39 Id.
41 Id. at 701.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
407 S.W.2d 695.
41 454 S.W.2d at 701.
46 Id. at 702.
47 Id. at 701.
11 R. LAWSON, supra note 1, at § 4.20.
[Vol. 73
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notes the two results of Cotton with respect to impeachment by
prior criminal convictions. Procedural safeguards were estab-
lished for the use of prior convictions against a criminal defend-
ant who elected to testify,49 and impeachment by evidence of
prior felonies was limited to only those felonies involving false-
hood, stealing or dishonesty.50
Subsequent decisions further delineated the Cotton standard.
Not only did the Court expand the list of admissible felony
convictions, 5' but it also allowed either party to identify the
felony offense after impeachment was initiated.1
2
B. Richardson v. Commonwealth
Against this background Richardson was decided. Kenneth
Richardson was convicted of criminal facilitation of both bur-
glary and robbery..3 On appeal, Richardson asserted that a Cot-
ton error had occurred when a prior conviction of burglary was
used to impeach him during trial.5 4
Concluding that Cotton prevented impeachment of the de-
fendant by proof of a prior felony conviction identical to that
for which the defendant was being tried, the Kentucky Court of
49 Id.
Id.
" Cotton enumerated those crimes involving dishonesty and false statement to be
"perjury, subornation of perjury, obtaining money or property under false pretenses,
forgery, embezzlement, counterfeiting, fraudulent alterations, misappropriation of funds,
false impersonation, passing checks without sufficient funds or on nonexistent banks,
fraudulent destruction of papers or wills, fraudulent concealment, making false entries,
and all felonies involving theft or stealing." 454 S.W.2d at 702. Subsequent decisions
have added to the Cotton list: "income tax evasion," Bogie v. Commonwealth, 467
S.W.2d 767 (Ky. 1971); "armed robbery," Thomas v. Commonwealth, 487 S.W.2d 954
(Ky. 1972); and "burglary," Martin v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 485 (Ky. 1974).
' The decisions which followed Cotton further delineated the rule concerning the
use of prior criminal acts to impeach. In Martin v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 485,
the Court noted that Cotton permitted impeachment of a defendant or witness by
evidence of multiple prior convictions, the identification of which was also admissible.
Similarly, in Bell v. Commonwealth, 520 S.W.2d 316 (Ky. 1975), the Court gave the
Commonwealth's attorney discretion-when asking the impeaching question-to identify
the offense. Prosecutorial silence permitted the defendant to identify the offense. Finally,
in Commonwealth v. Morris, 613 S.W.2d 616, 617 (Ky. 1981), the Court concluded that
either the prosecution or the defense may choose to identify the offense. See text
accompanying notes 53-77 infra for an explanation of how these situations are handled
following Commonwealth v. Richardson, 674 S.W.2d 515.
674 S.W.2d at 516.
.'Id.
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Appeals reversed Richardson's conviction. 55 Evidently, the court
of appeals determined that the potential for prejudice against
the defendant, where the impeaching offense and the charged
offense were identical, was greater than any impeachment value
of the prior conviction.5 6
On review, the Kentucky Supreme Court was faced with the
propriety of the appellate court's expansion of Cotton.17 Writing
for a divided Court, Justice Stephenson recognized that while
Cotton had not spared a witness with a prior felony conviction
the effect of presenting that fact to the jury, the decision had
limited impeachment to "dishonest felonies. "58
The Court found that the lower court's conclusion violated
the "plain language" of Cotton in removing burglary from the
list of "dishonest felonies." 59 Noting that the Kentucky Penal
Code defines burglary as "knowingly [entering] or [remaining]
unlawfully in a building" with the intent to commit a crime, 60
the Supreme Court determined that the "dishonest" nature of
burglary required that it remain available for impeachment pur-
poses .61
While introduction of the similar offense was potentially
prejudicial, the Court concluded that Cotton permitted impeach-
ment by a similar offense and that the trial court had not erred
in admitting evidence of Richardson's prior burglary convic-
tion.62
Citing Cotton, the Court affirmed Richardson's conviction
and continued: "We are of the further opinion that in answer
to the very real problem presented in this case, Cotton should
55 Id.
56 Id. at 517.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id., citing KRS § 511.020. KRS § 511.020(1) states in part:
A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when, with the intent to
commit a crime, he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building,
and when in effecting entry or while in the building or in the immediate
flight therefrom, he or another participant in the crime: [is armed or causes
or threatens injury].
61 674 S.W.2d at 517.
62 Id. "While we appreciate the force of Richardson's argument on the unfair
prejudice of introducing a prior conviction of the same type as the principal offense on
trial, we hold that Cotton and the subsequent cases cited herein approve this procedure
and thus the trial court did not commit error in this respect." Id.
[Vol. 73
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be and is hereby overruled. ' 63 Apparently, the "very real prob-
lem" was the prejudice to the defendant resulting from impeach-
ment by identifying for the jury a prior conviction for a similar
felony. 64 Thus, although unsympathetic to Richardson's individ-
ual plight, the Court did recognize that the Cotton rule could
be unnecessarily prejudicial to a defendant. By overruling Cotton
prospectively, the Court managed both to sustain Richardson's
conviction and to insure greater fairness in the treatment of
future defendants. 65
However, the result in Richardson raises three concerns: the
construction of the new impeachment rule, the scope of its
application, and the necessity for adopting the new rule.
Under Richardson, impeachment of a witness, including the
defendant, in a criminal case may be through proof of any prior
felony conviction. 66The Richardson rule does continue the re-
quirement-as in Cotton-of a pre-impeachment evaluation of
the relevancy of any prior convictions to the witness's credibil-
ity.67 This Richardson hearing is to "determine whether the
defendant will be unduly prejudiced by [the introduction of
evidence of prior convictions] ."68 The court is to consider "near-
ness or remoteness of the prior convictions [and] such other
factors as the court may deem pertinent." 69 In overruling Cot-
ton, the Court again permits the use of all prior felony convic-
tions, not just those of a "dishonest nature. ' 70 Although the
trial court retains discretion to refuse to permit impeachment by
prior felonies which do not reflect on credibility, the trial court
no longer has a clear rule requiring it to do so. Richardson thus
continues to require a Cotton-type hearing-although without
the bright line guidance of Cotton-to evaluate the relevancy of
prior convictions.
63 Id.
6, See id.
65 See id.
61 Id. at 518.
67 Id.
63 Id.
69 Id.
70 See id. at 517-18. Compare this rule with FRE 609(a), reproduced at note 31
supra. In contrast to the Kentucky rule, the Federal rule allows counsel for the govern-
ment to question the witness as to the "name of the crime, the time and place of
conviction, and the punishment." 3 J. WErNsTmN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
609[05], at 609-86, quoting E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 43, at 88 (1972).
19851
KENTUCKY LAW JoUiRNAL
Once the trial court determines that a prior felony conviction
may be used for impeachment, the actual impeachment proce-
dure is similar to that outlined in Cowan:
[T]he rule will be construed essentially as in Cowan .... so that
a witness may be asked if he has been previously convicted of
a felony. If his answer is "Yes," that is the end of it and the
court shall thereupon admonish the jury that the admission by
the witness of a felony may be considered only as it affects
his credibility as a witness if it does so. If the witness answers
"No" to this question, he may then be impeached by the
Commonwealth by the use of all prior convictions, and to the
extent that Cowan limits such evidence to one prior conviction,
it is overruled. After impeachment, the proper admonition
shall be given by the court.
Identification of the prior offense or offenses, before the jury,
by either the prosecution or the defense, is prohibited .... 7'
Thus, the defendant is given an opportunity to admit to a
single unspecified felony conviction. Should he fail to do so, the
prosecution is permitted to introduce evidence of all of the
defendant's prior felony convictions.
The apparent motive for the Court's overruling Cotton is a
preference for Cowan's absolute bar to the identification of the
prior felony offenses. Notably, neither prosecution nor defense
may identify the offense. Documentary evidence serving as the
basis for oral testimony as to the existence of a prior conviction
is not to be submitted to the jury if it contains any information
regarding "the nature of the offense on the prior conviction.' '72
The second area of concern entails understanding the pro-
spective applicability of Richardson. Richardson's conviction re-
mains in effect, having been affirmed on the basis of Cotton.
For subsequent defendants, Cotton is inapposite, having been
overruled by Richardson . 3 Yet there is some uncertainty as to
which defendants fall under the "prospective" rule.
Although the decision offers no explicit clarification of the
Court's intent, the implicit thrust of both Richardson and a
companion case, Diehl v. Commonwealth,74 is that Richardson
" 674 S.W.2d at 517-18.
71 Id. at 518.
7 Id. at 517.
- 673 S.W.2d 711 (Ky. 1984). Both Richardson and Diehl were decided June 14,
[V/ol. 73
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applies only to threatened or actual impeachment procedures
occurring after the Richardson opinion was rendered. In both
cases, correct application of the Cotton standard was upheld in
spite of the fact that Cotton did permit or would have permitted
identification of the prior felony offense.75
The third concern is the necessity for overruling Cotton. The
Court decided to overrule Cotton due to the "very real problem"
Richardson presented. 76 Apparently, the problem was the pres-
ence of similar convictions and the resulting prejudice to the
defendant.7 7 The solution to this problem, however, did not
require overruling Cotton.
The Court could have maintained the "dishonest felony"
rule of Cotton by simply restricting impeachment to introduction
of one felony conviction without identifying the felony itself.
This would have avoided the similar conviction problem since
the jury would only have been aware of the existence of a prior
"dishonest felony" and not of its similarity to the crime at issue.
Nor would there have been any undue prejudice to the defendant
under this approach, since the specific nature of the crime would
have remained undisclosed.
The Court could also have allowed for evaluation of the
prejudicial effect of the similar conviction in the Cotton hearing,
thus providing for its admission or exclusion based on the par-
ticular facts. The Court could also have reversed the appellate
court's conclusion that burglary was not a "dishonest" crime
without hazarding the "dishonest felony" rule. Admissibility of
any conviction could be based on evaluation of the prejudicial
effect on the defendant. This result would not have limited the
basic rule of Cotton in limiting impeachment to "dishonest
felonies."
III. SPONTANEOUS STATEMENTS: Res Gestae
Under Kentucky law, an out of court statement made in
response to a startling occurrence or event is generally admissi-
" See 674 S.W.2d at 517; 673 S.W.2d at 712. In Diehl, the Court emphasized that
the permissibility of impeachment by proof of a prior conviction for a similar offense
is contingent upon "trial court [determination] that the defendant will not be unduly
prejudiced by the introduction of such evidence." 673 S.W.2d at 712.
76 674 S.W.2d at 517.
" Id.
19851
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ble. 78 In order to be admissible, the extrajudicial statement must
have been spontaneously made in response to and concerning a
startling event, and must be otherwise competent as evidence. 79
These four elements establishing the admissibility of res ges-
tae statements by witnesses were reaffirmed by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals in Goodman v. Eads.80 In Goodman the
pedestrian plaintiff was crossing a city street at night when he
was struck by the defendant driver. 81 Testimony of the litigants
left unclear the circumstances which led up to the accident.8 2
Yet, the defendant, Eads, testified that several bystanders ran
up to the scene and stated: "[Goodman] ran in front of you. ' ' 3
The court concluded that the out of court declarations of these
witnesses satisfied the res gestae rule that the declarations be:
spontaneous, made in response to a startling event, made con-
cerning the event, and otherwise competent evidence. 84
IV. SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: POLYGRAPH TESTS
Conclusions derived from a scientific device or process are
generally admissible if that device or process has received general
scientific acceptance.8 5 Findings based on radar and breathalyzer
1s R. LAwsoN, supra note 1, at § 8.60. Under the federal rules, spontaneous
statements, declarations, or excited utterances are governed by FRE 803. FRE 803(1)
and (2) are the pertinent provisions:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event
or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition,
or immediately thereafter [is not excluded by the hearsay rule].
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress or excitement caused by the
event or condition [is likewise not excluded by the hearsay rule].
See generally 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10, at §§ 1745-64 (discussing requirements for
and explanation of res gestae exception to hearsay rule); Slough, Spontaneous Statements
and State of Mind, 46 IowA L. REv. 224 (1961) (comparison of UNIF. R. EVm. 63(4),
(12) hearsay exceptions formerly resolved almost exclusively in terms of res gestae).
11 Preston v. Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 398, 400 (Ky. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 920 (1967).
10 No. 83-CA-419-MR, slip op. at 4.
1, Id. at 1-2.
82 Id. at 2.
1, Id. at 4. For other cases involving spontaneous declarations arising from auto-
mobile accidents, see Annot., 53 A.L.R.2D 1245 (1957).
14 No. 83-CA-419-MR, slip op. at 4.
R. LAWSON, supra note I, at § 12.35(A). Cf. FRE 702 ("If scientific, technical,
or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
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tests are admissible in Kentucky because the underlying technol-
ogies have received general scientific acceptance.8 6 In fact, Ken-
tucky courts generally take judicial notice of their admissibility,
contingent primarily on proper operation and interpretation.8 7
Narcoanalysis and lie detector tests have not met with equal
success. 88 Results from narcoanalysis, the administration of truth
serum, have been repeatedly excluded from evidence.89 Poly-
graph results have also been found inadmissible. 90 In fact, the
Kentucky courts have held inadmissible any reference to a po-
lygraph examination for either evidentiary or impeachment pur-
poses .91
In Douthitt v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Comm'n,92 the
court of appeals had the opportunity to review polygraph ad-
missibility rules in a civil action. The plaintiff, Douthitt, was
dismissed by her employer for failure to undergo a polygraph
examination pursuant to an employment agreement. 93 The court
noted that the employer's polygraph rule, which required em-
ployees to undergo analysis at the request of the employer, was
unreasonable since the test results are unreliable. 94 The court
concluded that, even had Douthitt undergone the examination,
the findings would not have been admissible, since polygraph
results are inadmissible in both civil and criminal actions.95 In-
asmuch as polygraph results cannot show misconduct, one's
refusal to submit to an examination cannot constitute miscon-
duct. 96
The use of polygraph tests in the employment setting has
been the subject of considerable debate. 97 As evidenced by
otherwise."). See generally Gianelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye
v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLtuM. L. Rsv. 1197 (1980).
86 See Owens v. Commonwealth, 487 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1972) (breathalyzer); Ho-
neycutt v. Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 421 (Ky. 1966) (radar).
See 487 S.W.2d at 900.
U R. LAWSON, supra note 1, at § 12.35(A)(1). See 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 10,
at § 999.
89 See, e.g., Merritt v. Commonwealth, 386 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Ky. 1965).
10 See, e.g., Roberts v. Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 943, 944 (Ky. 1983).
91 See id. at 944.
92 676 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
11 Id. at 473.
Id. at 475.
95 Id.
96 Id.
9 See, e.g., Castagnera-Cain, Defamation, Invasion of Privacy, and the Use of
Lie Detectors in Employee Relations-an Overview, 4 GLENDALE L. REV. 189 (1982);
1985]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Douthitt, the validity of private industry's use of polygraph tests
on employees has entered the legal arena, requiring evaluation
of the evidentiary effect of such tests. Concern over the relia-
bility of these truth verification tests focuses on three factors:
empirical verification of the process, the emotional state of the
employee examined and the competence of the examiner.93
Often, as in Douthitt, the issue of the validity of polygraph
tests arises in the context of employee dismissals. Arbitration
proceedings under collective bargaining agreements have pro-
vided the most extensive decisional authority as to the evidentiary
status of truth verification processes in the employment relation-
ship. The majority of these decisions have either disallowed
polygraph evidence or have accorded it little probative weight. 99
The Kentucky Court of Appeals decision is in accord with de-
veloping labor law.' ° In fact, one arbitrator has specifically
stated that the truth verification process in the employment
context invades the right of privacy and the right against self-
incrimination. 101
Arbitrators and the courts are not alone in limiting the
utilization of polygraph tests in the employment relationship.
Several states have enacted legislation either limiting or prohib-
iting the use of polygraph examinations.10 2 These statutes, to
varying degrees, proscribe employer conduct. The employer may
be prohibited from requiring or demanding as a condition of
employment submission to polygraph examination. 03 Voluntary
submission upon the request of the employer may, however, be
Silas, Lie Box Battle, 70 A.B.A. J. 34 (Feb. 1984); Note, Lie Detectors in the Employ-
ment Context, 35 LA. L. REv. 694 (1974-75).
Gardner, Wiretapping the Mind: A Call to Regulate Truth Verification in
Employment, 21 SAN DiEGo L. Rav. 295, 300 (1984).
See, e.g., Temtex Prod. Inc. v. Stove, Furnace, & Allied Appliance Workers
Local 53, 75 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 233 (1980) (Rimer, Arb.); Bowman Transp. Inc. v.
International Union of Dist. 50, Local 13600, 59 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 283 (1972) (Murphy,
Arb.); Lag Drug Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 743, 39 Lab. Arb. (BNA)
1121 (1962) (Kelliher, Arb.).
11 676 S.W.2d at 472.
101 See 39 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 1123.
"I See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.037 (1972); CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2 (Deering
Supp. 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51(g) (West Supp. 1983-84); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 19, § 704 (1979); HAWAII REv. STAT. §§ 378-21, -22 (1976).
101 E.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51(g); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 193 (West 1976).
[Vol. 73
EVIDENCE
allowed.' °4 These state statutes are not limited to the issue of
polygraph test validity alone but also establish, often through
licensing, the quality of examiners and the accuracy and stand-
ardization of the administration and interpretation of tests.' °5
'1 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.2.
,o1 See ALA. CODE tit. 34, §§ 34-25-1 to -36 (1977 & Supp. 1981); ARiz. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 32.2701-.2715 (1976 & Supp. 1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 493.561-.569 (West
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